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Introduction 
 
Without doubt Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-69) is one of twentieth-century Iran’s towering activist-
intellectuals. Both in life and following his premature death he was seen to embody those pristine 
attributes of the engagé calling power to account.1 During his history of activism, Al-e Ahmad saw 
what he took to be the Soviet Union’s pernicious designs on Iran in the course of the Red Army’s 
occupation of northern Iran between 1941-1946, provoking him along with his longstanding 
mentor and leading socialist activist and thinker, Khalil Maleki (1901-69), to secede from the 
communist Tudeh Party in 1948. A mere five years later, he experienced in all its immediacy the 
MI6-CIA orchestrated overthrow of the nationalist prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, who 
pioneered the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, today known as British 
Petroleum.2 As a member of the Toilers Party of the Iranian Nation (Hezb-e zahmatkeshan-e 
mellat-e Iran), which too suffered divisions and ultimately broke into two distinct groups, one for, 
and another antagonistic to Mosaddeq, Al-e Ahmad once more sided with the elder Maleki in favor 
of the beleaguered Mosaddeq. The Mosaddeq government faced severe pressure due to a British-
                                               
1 Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran, With an Introduction by E.L. Doctorow 
ed. (New York, 1977)., Chapter 5.  
2 Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations  (New York & 
London, 2013). Ali  Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks (Cambridge 
and New York, 2015). 
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enforced oil embargo in a calculated endeavor to strangle one of its key sources of revenue. 
Following the successful coup d’état and installation of General Fazlollah Zahedi as premier, Al-
e Ahmad and an entire generation of activists and intellectuals underwent one of the great traumas 
of a generation, witnessing the full-throated repression of his one-time comrades in the Tudeh 
Party, along with the arrest and imprisonment of myriad luminaries in the national movement. 
After three weeks in hiding Al-e Ahmad would himself be arrested and condemned to prison 
without trial.3 And it was upon the ashes of the movement to which he had wholeheartedly 
subscribed that he saw the erection of a seemingly impervious police state built with the support 
of the United States, the ascendant imperial power of the day.4 
 
This troubled history impressed itself on the engaged writer’s consciousness and political 
commitments, in tandem with a sensitivity to similar struggles against imperialism and neo-
colonialism the world over. Anti-colonialism, non-alignment and the quest for national self-
determination came to be touchstones of his political formation and identity, and impressed 
themselves upon his best-known work, Gharbzadegi (1962), usually translated at 
“Westoxification” or “West-struckness”. Al-e Ahmad’s contributions to literature, the history of 
ideas, and political struggle have been discussed and analyzed by several scholars, as has the 
subject of this specific article, his sojourn in Israel.5 This article’s contribution resides both in its 
novel reading and interpretation of Al-e Ahmad’s writings on Israel and the political vision which 
                                               
3 For further biographical details and analysis of his works see, Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The 
Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran  (New Brunswick, NJ, 2006)., Chapter 1. Robert  Wells, 
"Jalal Ale Ahmad: Write and Political Activist " (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1982)., 7-8. 
4 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development  (Harmondsworth, Middlesex & New York, 1979). 
5 See, Dabashi, Theology of Discontent., 67. Samuel Thrope’s introduction to, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli 
Republic Translated with an introductory essay by Samuel Thrope ed. (Brooklyn, New York, 2013). Lior B. 
Sternfeld, Between Iran and Zion: Jewish Histories of Twentieth-Century Iran  (Stanford, California, 2018)., Loc 
1830. 
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emanates therefrom and in the examination of these writings within the broader context of Iranian 
socialism in the 1960s. We draw upon a number of key sources, including two other Israeli 
travelogues authored by Iranian social democrats, which have not been seriously explored until 
now. Reading these in conjunction with Al-e Ahmad and in their appropriate historical context 
permits us to argue for the distinctiveness of Al-e Ahmad’s insights in contrast to other prominent 
Iranian social democrats. The latter uncritically accepted the role of “socialist Zionism”, 
perceiving it as the benevolent agent of a civilizing mission in Palestine – much like how socialist 
Zionism imagined itself. We argue that Al-e Ahmad’s intervention is fascinating and worthy of 
wider consideration because of the manner in which he relates what he takes to be a sui generis 
manifestation of sovereign expression in the founding of a Jewish state to the Shiʿite notion of 
velayat, or “guardianship”, even as he never loses sight of Palestine as a site of colonial violence, 
subjugation and exclusion, and a means by which European imperial powers have sought 
absolution for their role in the Judeocide. We argue that what distinguishes Al-e Ahmad from his 
fellow Iranian social democrats who became enamored of socialist Zionism is his cognitive 
incorporation of the category of coloniality.6 His understanding of coloniality not only allowed 
him to see certain dynamics of dispossession and expropriation missed by others, namely those, 
who in the words of Frantz Fanon, had been flung into a “zone of nonbeing”,7 but also facilitated 
his tethering of colonial social relations across multiple scales, traversing the local, regional and 
the global. 
 
Historical and Intellectual Context of Al-e Ahmad’s Visit to Israel  
                                               
6 For further information on the ontology of coloniality see, Aníbal Quijano, "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality 
" Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (2007).  
7 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks trans. Charles  Lam Markmann, Introduction by Paul Gilroy ed. (London 
and New York, 2017)., Loc 257.  
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Al-e Ahmad and his equally distinguished wife, the intellectual and novelist Simin Daneshvar, 
visited Israel for two weeks in February 1963 at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8 
The motivations behind the visit were complex, but the confluence of two factors are of note. 
Firstly, as recounted by Israel’s political representative to Iran at the time, Meir Ezri, there was a 
concerted effort at cultural diplomacy in a bid to shape Iranian public opinion, with a direct focus 
upon the intelligentsia, students and political figures.9 Ezri and his colleagues in Israel’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs saw it as incumbent upon them to invite and host influential Iranians in what 
might be considered the “soft power” counterpart to Ben-Gurion’s periphery doctrine. Secondly, 
and more importantly in the specific case of Al-e Ahmad, were the writings and engagement of 
Iranian socialists of an anti-Stalinist orientation and their search for an alternative model of 
socializing the relations of production, above all in the agricultural sphere. Crucially, this period 
coincided with Iran’s experience of a major, albeit profoundly uneven transition from a 
predominantly rural society to an increasingly urban and capitalist one.10 To be sure, Iranian anti-
Soviet socialists were looking for an alternative that would be free of the heavy human toll, 
authoritarianism and violence unleashed by the Soviet policy of agricultural collectivization which 
had begun in earnest in 1928 under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. But there were also very local 
reasons for their search for socialist alternatives to the Soviet Union.  
 
The curiosity of Iranian socialists, above all those close to Khalil Maleki, of whom Al-e Ahmad 
had long considered himself a disciple, regarding socialism in Israel and the kibbutzim, had been 
                                               
8 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil (Tehran, 1373)., 15.  
9 Meir  Ezri, Yadnameh trans. Ebrahim Hakhami (Jerusalem 2000)., 177.  
10 Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development. Bizhan Jazani, Tarh-e jameʿeh shenasi va mabani-ye esteratezhi-
ye jonbesh-e enqelabi-ye Iran: bakhsh-e avval (eqtesadi)  (Tehran, 1358). 
 Accepted Pre-Publication, Pre-Edited Version 
5 
 
piqued in the early 1950s. These socialists’ profound distrust of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh 
Party of Iran had led Maleki, Al-e Ahmad, along with several other leading members to secede 
from the latter in 1948. Maleki would subsequently establish the Third Force Party (Hezb-e niru-
ye sevvom), propelling its committed members to search for alternative laboratories in socialist 
politics, which they believed could safeguard Iranian independence while furnishing it with a more 
humane and just way of organizing both economy and society. Over the years several Iranian 
socialists associated with Maleki’s Third Force and a subsequent incarnation in the form of the 
League of Iranian Socialists, including Maleki himself, would visit Israel to investigate what Israel 
and the kibbutz system had to offer (see below).11 Visits by Iranian intellectuals and political 
activists, such as Maleki, Al-e Ahmad, Dariush Ashuri, and even the first and future president of 
the Islamic Republic, Abolhasan Banisadr,12 who was a young activist in the Second National 
Front at the time, were generally initiated and facilitated by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
As mentioned above, these visits were part of an attempt to strengthen cultural ties between Israel 
and Pahlavi Iran. It should be emphasized that these figures were by no means alone in taking up 
this offer to visit Israel, and as Ezri’s memoir demonstrates, many journalists and politicians were 
more than happy to accept the invitation.13 Moreover, Iranian communists in the Tudeh Party also 
harbored mixed feelings regarding the Israeli state. As Lior Sternfeld has persuasively shown, 
though there was certainly severe criticism of the Israeli government in newspapers associated 
with outspoken members of the Tudeh Party, there was also no escaping the fact that the Soviet 
Union had supported the UN partition plan in 1947 and was the second state to officially recognize 
the Israeli state on 17 May 1948.14  
                                               
11 Homa Katouzian, Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism (London, 2018)., Loc 3062. 
12 "Interview with Dariush Ashuri,"  (19 December 2018). 
13 Ezri, Yadnameh , 178-179.  
14 Sternfeld, Between Iran and Zion., Loc 1113.  
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The timing of Al-e Ahmad’s visit is all the more fascinating in that only a month earlier 
Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, had convened a national referendum on the six-points 
of his much-regaled “White Revolution”, an explicitly anti-communist and pre-emptive reform 
measure under the sway of American modernization theory,15 which had land reform at its heart. 
Incidentally, the Minister of Agriculture at the time, Hassan Arsanjani, who is often credited with 
almost single-handedly crafting the Amended Land Reform Law of 1963, had especially close 
relations with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir even honored him with a gala dinner upon 
one of his visits to the country.16 The Shah’s patience with Arsanjani’s populist outreach to the 
Iranian peasantry rapidly wore thin and he would dismiss the minister in the same month as Al-e 
Ahmad’s visit to Israel. Nonetheless, Iranian socialists of all stripes would struggle to make sense 
of what the Shah’s reforms meant for socialist politics and how they ought to be interpreted in the 
broader sweep of Iran’s transition to a capitalist economy.  
      
Another important point to foreground is the impact of Hungarian-British journalist and lapsed 
communist turned Cold War warrior, Arthur Koestler (d. 1983), whose novels and essays 
upbraiding Soviet communism had a huge impact on Iranian socialists of the “third way” 
persuasion. Indeed, the periodical ʿElm va zendegi (Science and Life) (2nd run) and its predecessor 
Nabard-e zendegi (Life’s Battle), affiliated with Khalil Maleki and his associates, had proven 
instrumental in initially translating Koestler’s writings and introducing him to an Iranian audience. 
                                               
15 W.W.  Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (Cambridge and New 
York, 1990 [1960]). Nils Gilsman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore and London, 2003). 
16 Abbas Milani, Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979, Kindle ed. 
(Syracuse, New York, 2008)., Loc 2294.  
 Accepted Pre-Publication, Pre-Edited Version 
7 
 
Some of these articles originally appeared in center-left and anti-Soviet publications such as the 
now infamous Encounter magazine, which was later revealed to be partially funded by the CIA, 
and as playing a notable role in the so-called Cultural Cold War.17 Koestler’s well-known 
contribution to The God that Failed (1950) and his seminal anti-totalitarian novel, Darkness at 
Noon (1940), were known to Iranian audiences, and the latter, perhaps Koestler’s best known novel 
had been translated into Persian by a former Tudeh member who subsequently joined Third Force, 
ʿAli-Akbar Khobrehzadeh. Koestler’s novel Thieves in the Night: Chronicle of an Experiment 
(1946), an idealistic account of the Zionist settler movement based on his experiences of living in 
a kibbutz had also been encountered by Iranian intellectuals and is explicitly mentioned by Al-e 
Ahmad in his own Israeli travelogue.18 By Al-e Ahmad’s own admission, it was because of his 
initial engagement with Darkness at Noon, which made waves amongst a generation of Iranian 
socialists disillusioned with the Tudeh and by extension the Soviet Union, that he came across 
Koestler’s enthused and partisan defense of the nascent Israeli state: “Like us, when he broke with 
Stalin, Koestler was drawn to the kibbutz,” he recalls.19 Maleki and Third Force’s rejection of the 
Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party,20 alongside the emergence of a highly visible anti-Soviet 
socialist intellectual current which counted Koestler, André Gide,21 Sidney Hook and Ignazio 
                                               
17 ʿElm va zendegi translated Koestler’s “An Essay on Snobbery” which was first published in Encounter magazine 
in September 1955. Arthur Koestler, "Tajziyeh va tahlili az senobism," ʿElm va zendegi (Farvardin 1338 
[March/April 1959])., 79. Its predecessor publication Nabard-e zendegi similarly published the writings of other 
famous Cold War anti-communists such as Sidney Hook. Sidney Hook and Bertrand Russell, "Akharin tasmim 
zendeh mandan ya chizi balatar az an? ," Nabard-e zendegi (Dey 1337 [December 1958-January 1959])., 24. For 
details concerning the role played by Koestler, Hook and many others in the cultural Cold War see, Frances  Stonor 
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York, 1999). 
18 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 439. 
19 Ibid., Loc 451. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil., 57-58. 
Shams Al-e Ahmad claims that the unsigned articles about the kibbutz published in ʿElm va zendegi were written by 
Maleki. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 16. 
20 This rejection is readily evident in much of Maleki’s writings from the early 1950s onwards, but perhaps best 
demonstrated in his polemic and critique of the Tudeh Party following the 1953 coup. Khalil Maleki, Dars-e 28 
Mordad: az lahaz-e nehzat-e melli-ye Iran va az lahaz-e rahbaran-e khaʾen-e hezb-e Tudeh (Tehran, 1394 [2015]).  
21 Al-e Ahmad had translated Gide’s Return from the U.S.S.R. (1333 [1954-5]) and The Fruits of the Earth (1343 
[1964-5]. Ehsan Yarshater has contended that the translation of the latter text was particularly poor and that Al-e 
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Silone, amongst its leading lights, defined much of the context of Al-e Ahmad’s visit and 
evaluation of the Israeli state.  It should be made clear that we are not interested here in the question 
of whether Maleki and others’ critiques of the Tudeh Party are either fair or accurate, or the “true” 
nature of the party’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Rather we are concerned with how these 
negative perceptions and appraisals diffused amongst members of the Iranian intelligentsia and 
conditioned their views of socialist Zionism. 
 
The Socialist League and Israel: The Cases of Ashuri and Maleki 
 
Two Israel travelogues, written by fellow anti-Soviet socialists and published briefly before that 
of Al-e Ahmad deserve special attention, for they had undoubtedly influenced his own intention 
to visit, and played a role in shaping his view of Israel. These travelogues are Maleki’s own 
detailed account of his visit to Israel published in February-March 1962 under the title, Didari az 
ʿarz-e mowʿud (Journey to the Promised Land) in ʿElm va zendegi,22 and Dariush Ashuri’s 
Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil (Travelogue to Israel), published in Ketab-e mah (Book of the Month) at 
the request of Al-e Ahmad himself a couple of months later in May-June 1962.23 Incidentally, 
Ashuri’s travelogue would appear in the very same issue as Al-e Ahmad’s landmark essay 
“Westoxification” (Gharbzadegi).24 And, despite the fact that he was not formally a member of 
                                               
Ahmad had only a rather tenuous grasp of French. Mandana Zandiyan and Ehsan  Yarshater, Ehsan Yarshater dar 
goftogu ba Mandana Zandiyan (Los Angeles, 2016). 
22  Khalil  Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud," ʿElm va zendegi, no. 2 (Esfand 1340 [February/March 1962]). 
23 "Interview with Dariush Ashuri." Dariush Ashuri, "Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil," Ketab-e mah (Khordad 1341 [May-
June 1962]). 
24 As evidenced by published SAVAK records Al-e Ahmad was still in regular contact with Maleki and the 
membership of the League of Iranian Socialists and would participate in their meetings. Jalal Al-e Ahmad beh 
revayat-e asnad-e SAVAK (Tehran, 1379 [2000])., 20.  
 Accepted Pre-Publication, Pre-Edited Version 
9 
 
the Socialist League, with which ʿElm va zendegi was affiliated, Al-e Ahmad would regularly 
publish in the journal.25  
 
Maleki’s trip to Israel took place following his attendance of the Seventh Congress of the Socialist 
International convened in Rome in October 1961. It was at this conference that he first met 
representatives of the Israeli center-left party, the Mapai (Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel), 
and one of its most prominent leaders, Moshe Sharett, Israel’s second prime minister, with whom 
he quickly hit it off. During his trip he would lunch at Sharett’s home with officials of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs,26 and meet then Foreign Minister Golda Meir, upon whose grasp of world 
affairs he would admiringly remark.27  
 
Maleki’s essay conveys his uncritical embrace of socialist Zionism and regurgitation of several 
founding myths of the Israeli state. In his words,  
 
…a distinguished number of the most dedicated and compassionate 
individuals with the ideal of bringing into existence a center of 
national independence in the land of Israel and through 
incomparable self-sacrifice they named it the miracle of Israel. They 
made a barren desert verdant, exuberant and bounteous. They 
brought into existence village cooperatives where life, production 
                                               
25 See for example, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, "Varshekastegi-ye matbuʿat," ʿElm va zendegi (Farvardin 1338 [March/April 
1959])., 9. 
26 Khalil  Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud," ibid., no. 2 (Esfand 1340 [February/March 1962])., 21. 
27 Maleki would even try and justify his meeting with Meir at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by citing his deep 
respect for women’s rights. Ibid., 29.  
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and distribution are collective and are the best and most democratic 
example of socialism in the world today.28  
 
The decisive support of imperial Britain in the form of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, or 
subsequently during the colonial Mandate period are passed over without consideration.29 The 
well-known Zionist trope of making “the desert bloom” appears on several occasions, whereby the 
social and agricultural life of Palestine’s Arab population is expunged from the historical record, 
and Zionism’s “civilizing mission” is seen as a vehicle for progress and industry and the 
modernization of an otherwise desolate and “backward” (aqab mandeh) hinterland.30 Maleki is 
absolutely taken with what he sees as Israel’s technological advances and technocratic expertise 
and their implications for socio-economic development and speaks of newly independent nations 
in Africa and Asia which eagerly look to Israel for training and support. Maleki’s visit also 
occurred at a time when Mapai and the Histadrut (General Organization of Workers in Israel), 
Israel’s national federation of unions, had been making a conscious effort to cultivate political 
relationships in the African continent in exchange for technical assistance and expertise, and 
thereby establish their presence in the developing world.31 In Maleki’s words, the Histadrut and 
its Afro-Asian Institute, which provided training to African and Asian students “is doing 
                                               
28 Ibid., 18. Ashuri echoes this sentiment when he declaims the Jews of Israel “have created the greatest exemplars 
of socialist society on the basis of village life”. Ashuri, "Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil.", 133. 
29 See, Patrick  Wolfe, Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race (London and New York, 2016)., Chapter 7.  
Bernard Regan, The Balfour Declaration: Empire, the Mandate and Resistance in Palestine  (London and New 
York, 2017). 
30 Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud.", 19-20. Manuchehr Safa, "Maʾsaleh-ye esraʾil aʿrab," Nabard-e zendegi (Dey 
1337 [December 1958-January 1959]). The latter article, while still certainly problematic on several counts, offers a 
more sober-minded and critical assessment. 
31 Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud.", 28. 
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something which the socialists of the advanced European countries still haven’t done until 
today”.32 
 
In Maleki’s view we find the confluence of a profoundly Eurocentric conception of development 
in tandem with a valorization of an image of developmentalism found widely within the 
decolonizing world and often associated with the principles of independence and self-
determination. Maleki was unable to see or analytically come to terms with the systematic 
expulsion and displacement of the indigenous population upon which such “development” was 
predicated. His obliviousness to this point appears to attest to Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s 
contention that “recognition precedes cognition”.33 In other words, Maleki’s unapologetic 
Eurocentricity and consequent invisibilization of the Palestinians prevented him from 
understanding how Israeli developmental prowess emerged out of a settler-colonial project defined 
by the ever-increasing expansion of control over territory and the concomitant expropriation of the 
native.34 This colonial dimension was not only self-evident to contemporaneous Palestinian and 
Arab intellectuals, but also to Iranian Islamists.35 
 
                                               
32 Ibid., 28.  
33 Boaventura  de Sousa Santos, The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the 
South  (Durham and London, 2018)., 3. 
34 The settler-colonial paradigm and the specific relations of power in the case of Palestine, dynamics which simply 
do not show up or present themselves to Maleki, were delineated and analyzed by Palestinian and Arab intellectuals 
in the course of the 1960s. A classic example is Fayez A.  Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (Beirut, 1965).. 
The settler-colonial framework would find itself further developed in subsequent decades, most notably by Nur 
Masalha and Patrick Wolfe. Nur  Masalha, The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, 
Reclaiming Memory (London & New York, 2012)., Chapter 1. Patrick  Wolfe, "Settler colonialism and the 
elimination of the native " Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006). 
Maldonado-Torres sees invisibility and dehumanization as the primary expressions of the “coloniality of being”. de 
Sousa Santos, The End of the Cognitive Empire., 20. 
35 See, Hadi Khosrowshahi, Zendegi va mobarezeh-ye Navvab Safavi  (Tehran, 1386 [2007]). 
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This blind-spot is also evident in Maleki’s effusive celebration of the Histadrut and kibbutzim, 
which emerged as archetypes of socialist practice, without the slightest grasp of its history – 
including the earlier campaigns of the “Conquest of Labor” or “Hebrew Labor” during the 1920s 
to 1940s – where the industries of the Yishuv were actively discouraged from and boycotted for 
using Arab labour.36 In the words of Patrick Wolfe, “the campaign for the Conquest of Labour 
underpinned core Zionist institutions such as the kibbutz and the labour organisation Histadrut, 
striving for a totally insulated Jewish-only capsule that really would conduct its affairs (at least, 
its non-military ones) as if nobody else were around…Israel was founded on a boycott.”37 Indeed, 
according to Ben-Gurion himself when General-Secretary of the Histadrut in 1922, “We are 
conquerors of the land facing an iron wall, and we have to break through it…The creation of a new 
Zionist movement, a Zionist movement of workers, is the first prerequisite for the fulfillment of 
Zionism. Without such a movement, our work in this country will come to nothing.”38 On this 
view, the Histadrut was indispensable to the realization of the territorial ambitions of the Zionist 
movement itself. Furthermore, even though the rhetoric, tenor and emphasis of some Histadrut 
policies vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens of Israel changed after the establishment of the new state, 
significant forms of exclusion and discrimination persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s,39 the 
analysis of which is completely absent in Maleki’s rose-tinted evaluation. 
 
                                               
36 Steven A.  Glazer, "Picketing for Hebrew Labor: A Window on Histadrut Tactics and Strategy," Journal of 
Palestine Studies 30, no. 4 (2001). 
37 Wolfe, Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race , Loc 5279. Zachary Lockman, "Land, Labor and the 
Logic of Zionism: A Critical Engagement with Gershon Shafir " Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (2012)., 12.  
38 Zeev  Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State trans. 
David  Maisel (Princeton, New Jersey, 1998)., 21.  
39 Maha  Nassar, Brothers Apart: Palestinian Citizens of Israel and the Arab World (Stanford, California, 2017)., 79, 
90, 93.  
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Maleki’s understanding of Israel and socialist Zionism was also skewed by the democratic socialist 
and parliamentary system he envisioned for Iran, and the kind of institutions he deemed necessary 
to realize it in practice. This explains his deep fascination with the political organization of Mapai, 
the party’s labour college for training cadres, and the Histadrut.40 Throughout his travels he 
marvels at the Histadrut’s huge national membership, the recognition of housewives as workers 
with attendant rights, the vibrant role of cooperatives, and the provision of universal health 
insurance. On Maleki’s view, the Israel of Mapai was an island of civility in an otherwise 
inhospitable region, and in key respects it was everything that Iran was not: democratic, socialist 
and progressive – undoubtedly, an important factor in socialist Zionism’s seductive appeal for him. 
But Maleki simply did not entertain the possibility that Palestinians might not be treated equally 
by Israel’s national trade union center, or that Mapai’s welfarism also had a colonial component 
excluding and institutionalizing discrimination against Palestinians. Instead he reiterates “the 
fundamental principle of the Histadrut has always been this: no exploitation, self-help, mutual 
aid.”41 There is thus little doubt in the words of Ezri that Maleki “became enamored (shifteh) of 
the Israeli labor movement”.42 
 
Maleki ends his essay with a visit to the Chaim Weizmann Institute of Science and a hagiographic 
biography of Israel’s first president, Weizmann himself. Maleki admiringly identifies with 
Weizmann and his marriage of a career in science and politics. Maleki had studied chemistry as a 
student in Berlin in the 1920s, just as Weizmann had done in the 1890s.  During his tour of the 
institute Maleki is taken to Weizmann’s old office where he marveled, “this simple and modest 
                                               
40 Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud.", 22-23.  
41 Ibid., 27. 
42 Ezri, Yadnameh ., 184. 
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room had far more effect [upon me]” than St Peter’s Basilica at the Vatican, which he had seen 
during previous tours of Europe.43 
 
Dariush Ashuri visited Israel as a student representative of the League of Iranian Socialists, and 
though he did not initially plan to write up an account of his visit, a curious Al-e Ahmad prevailed 
on the young man who would go on to become a prolific literary critic and translator in his own 
right, to write about his experience.44 His essay is rather short and minimal, but nevertheless 
contains several interesting observations, which echo those of his mentor, Maleki. Immediately 
taken in by the austerity of Tel Aviv airport, he quickly asserts that “there is no dominant 
exploitative class that can take the bulk of national income for itself” and observes the absence of 
glaring differences of living standards amongst Israelis.45 Like Maleki, he is impressed by what he 
views as Israelis’ humble lifestyles and modest apartments, the ready availability of social housing 
and public transport. “I didn’t see one big luxury American car” he proclaims.46 “One point that is 
clear in Israel is the society’s proclivity towards socialism”, he avers.47 Ashuri traveled widely, 
spending time in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Tiberias, and the Negev. While in West Jerusalem he 
comments on the bullet holes and barbed wire, physical markers of the 1948 war, even while the 
Palestinians are almost entirely absent from his narrative.  
 
The young student visitor speaks of the “Buddhist quiet” during Shabbat, adding “even though 
most intellectuals don’t have clear religious beliefs, they give special importance to religious 
                                               
43 Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud.", 31.  
44 "Interview with Dariush Ashuri." 
45 Ashuri, "Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil.", 122.  
46 Ibid., 123.  
47 Ibid., 132. 
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rituals because they are the most important factor of solidarity for this people (qom)”.48 Amusingly, 
however, he is thoroughly underwhelmed by those sites which are supposedly the stuff of biblical 
legend. Upon seeing Mount Zion and the Jordan River he remarked, “I feel sorry for these Israelis 
who don’t even have one proper mountain so as not to call any steep incline a mountain! This 
sense of pity is also felt upon seeing the Jordan River”.49 Ashuri continued his journey with a visit 
to the Knesset and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where he met with a German Jew teaching 
Persian. He speaks highly of students’ considerable role in university management and generous 
student aid. Finally, in passing he mentions the university’s Arab students even as he admits that 
“in proportion to the Arab population of Israel it’s a small number. I wanted to speak with them, 
but the means to talk were not available.”50 Much like when Maleki recounts his failure to raise 
“the issue of the Arabs” in his meeting with Golda Meir, because “the simple, friendly and 
interesting” discussion of Iran had already “taken too much of the foreign minister’s valuable 
time”,51 the university’s Palestinian students, were hardly deemed a priority or warranting explicit 
concern.  
 
Perhaps most revealing are Ashuri’s description of the kibbutzim he visited in the north of Israel 
and the Negev desert. Although he is unable to actually see it in such terms he provides a vivid 
account of the settler-colonial project and its frontiersman ethos, and like Maleki he swallows 
wholesale the myth of a desolate land awaiting redemption: “The promised land is very small 
without water or greenery…In this land to which Moses brought his chosen people from Egypt, 
                                               
48 Qom also carries the connotations of family, nation, race, and ethnicity. Ibid., 126. 
49 Ibid., 126. 
50 Ibid., 129.  
51 Maleki, "Didari az arz-e mowʿud.". 29. 
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there was neither water nor prosperity.”52 Almost incidentally he notes that many of the kibbutzim 
along the border where he was able to see the military outposts of the Jordanian and Syrian armies, 
were not only for the purposes of agriculture, but also “to defend the country”. In the Negev he 
describes the Israeli government’s efforts to irrigate the desert by diverting water from the Sea of 
Galilee, and a young generation of Israelis and the kibbutzim they have founded. Despite dutifully 
noting the kibbutz’s school, food hall, and music auditorium, he cannot help but notice the fact 
that the residents are heavily armed and surrounded by fortifications.53 Palestinian Arabs are either 
absent, except as recipients of Israeli largess, or spectral threats to an otherwise peaceful and 
egalitarian society. Even when he acknowledges that Israel is “a country of immigrants; countries 
made up of immigrants like the United States, Canada, Australia, until two centuries ago there was 
no sign of development (towseʿeh) or civilization (tamadon)”.54 He either unconsciously or 
unknowingly reprises the “color line” famously delineated by W.E.B. Du Bois,55 seemingly 
oblivious to the fact that all of the white settler societies he enumerates were profoundly marked 
by either histories of ethnic cleansing or genocidal violence in the process of their founding and 
that manifold iterations of the “civilizing mission” were repeatedly invoked to justify just this kind 
of violence.56 
 
Ashuri, however, does pick up on the intra-Jewish cleavages running through Israeli society. In 
this respect he contends that,  
                                               
52 Ashuri, "Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil.", 130. 
53 Ibid., 130.  
54 Ibid., 131. 
55 W.E.B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York, 1996)., Loc 173. 
56 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge and New York, 2008)., Introduction. Eve Tuck and K. 
Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society, Vol. 1, No. 
1., 1-40. 
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in Israel a complete and pure national integration has still not come 
into being, in the sense that every group of Jewish migrants has its 
own characteristics and traditions and they live separately…These 
differences in lifestyle, manners and traditions exist particularly 
between immigrant groups from Asia and Africa on the one side and 
Europe and America on the other.  
 
When Ashuri visits an Iranian-Jewish neighborhood and speaks to an Iranian immigrant he speaks 
to him in Persian only remarking that his Jewish countryman was “not very satisfied”, quoting him 
as saying, “the Iranians don’t get along with the [Jewish] Iraqis and Kurds”.57 This is an issue 
which Al-e Ahmad’s essay would also address, albeit in a manner that was more cognizant of the 
real cleavages and differences separating Ashkenazi and Mizrahi (or Sephardic) Jews in terms of 
history, language and traditions, restating how Sephardim had at one time or another lived 
alongside Muslims (a history occluded in the neologism of “Judeo-Christian civilization”), and 
even differentials in power internal to Israeli society: “Solving this basic conflict between two 
types of manners and cultures is the primary difficulty of the state of Israel”.58 
 
Jalal’s Angel of Death 
 
Al-e Ahmad’s account of his two weeks in Israel is provocative and ambivalent throughout, 
sharing a number of commonalities, but also differing at key points from the travelogues of Ashuri 
                                               
57 Ashuri, "Safarnameh-ye Esraʾil.", 131. 
58 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 601-606. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 74. 
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or Maleki.59 As mentioned above, Al-e Ahmad’s visit also took place under the aegis of the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was organized and hosted by a young Israeli official by the name 
of Zvi Rafiah, who was based in Iran between 1961 and 1963.60 Al-e Ahmad’s complete 
disillusionment with Israeli socialism was inseparable from his similarly critical reassessment of 
the French left, which became fully rancorous in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of June 
1967. The war and the French intelligentsia’s response provoked him to write another essay, which 
was subsequently added to the original travelogue and posthumously published as Safar beh 
velayat-e ezraʾil (Journey to the Land of Azrael, hereafter referred to as SVE). This is not to say 
that Al-e Ahmad was naively uncritical of Israel and the dispossession of Palestinians upon his 
first and only visit to the country, but rather that his views at this stage were far from settled and 
were still in a state of fluidity and motion. This ambivalence would turn into what can only be 
described as revilement in the aftermath of 1967 (see below).  
 
Before analyzing the text and its insights for how it understands political theology in Israel and 
potentially Iran, some preliminary comments on the history of SVE are in order. Al-e Ahmad’s 
travelogue was initially published in the journal Andisheh va honar (Thought and Art) in 
September/October 1964, whose editor was another former Tudeh member by the name of Naser 
Vosuqi. The final chapter of SVE, entitled “The Beginning of a Hatred” (Aghaz-e yek nefrat) which 
Al-e Ahmad published under the cover of a letter from an Iranian friend in Europe, is said to have 
appeared in Jong-e honar-e emruz and Donya-ye jadid on 24 June 1967, a mere two weeks after 
                                               
59 The New York Times’ review of the novel is revealing in this regard and its reservations regarding Koestler’s 
partisanship in favor of the Zionist settler enterprise: “there is never a time when he questions the right of his people 
to dominate the land in which the Arabs are and have long been in a majority.” The same can be said for Maleki and 
Ashuri’s travelogues. Richard  Watts Jr., "Koestler's Novel of Zionism " The New York Times 3 November 1946. 
60 This has been detailed by Samuel Thrope in his introduction to the English translation of Al-e Ahmad’s 
travelogue. Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Introduction. 
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Israel’s devastating defeat of the Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and the beginning of an 
occupation and ongoing process of colonization that continues until today.61 According to his 
brother Shams Al-e Ahmad, the concocted letter resulted in the permanent closure of Donya-e 
jadid. It was accurately construed as a blistering indictment, harboring implications not only for 
the Pahlavi regime’s low-level diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, but the Shah’s broader 
regional policy seen to be fundamentally in step with the strategic interests of a declining British 
empire as well as the new post-WWII imperial hegemon, the United States. Copies of the article 
were reportedly gathered and destroyed by the Shah’s security apparatus, the notorious SAVAK 
(Sazman-e etelaʿat va amniyat-e keshvar). According to Shams Al-e Ahmad, however, it was taken 
up and reprinted in the city of Qom, home to many of Iran’s pre-eminent Shiʿi seminaries, as a 
thirty-two page booklet with a three page introduction by someone with the pen-name Abu Rashad 
under the title of “Israel, Agent of Imperialism”.62 
 
Reception of SVE 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we can speak of two historiographical appropriations of SVE. The first 
under the auspices of Shams Al-e Ahmad, who sought to downplay his brother’s apparent 
fascination with the new state of Israel and the kibbutz, in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution 
                                               
61 Hamid Dabashi in his classic volume Theology of Discontent has cast doubt on the authenticity of the final chapter 
of Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil. Dabashi, Theology of Discontent., 69. There does not appear to be much by way of 
concrete evidence for these doubts, and despite not being able to locate the original, Dariush Ashuri recounted his 
memory of the article’s publication following the 1967 war. Furthermore,Al-e Ahmad’s wife Simin Daneshvar 
never publicly repudiated it. Additionally, the article’s denunication of the Israeli state as an agent of Western 
imperialism, is in keeping with the rhetoric prevailing on the Arab left during this period, and as we argue below, the 
difference between the two essays should not be overstated or exaggerated. What can be said, however, is that the 
title of the postthumously published book was certainly not of Al-e Ahmad’s choosing. "Interview with Dariush 
Ashuri." 
62 Al-e Ahmad, Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 41.  
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of 1979. By this time, Jalal Al-e Ahmad had been enshrined  as one of the leading lights of Iran’s 
“Islamic revival” and as one of the few intellectuals to speculatively forecast the triumph of the 
Shiʿi clergy’s organic leadership in the struggle against the Shah’s regime.63 Al-e Ahmad’s 
Gharbzadegi proved a crucial source of intellectual and political inspiration for a generation of 
oppositional activists in a way few other texts could rival. It traversed the permeable and largely 
contrived boundaries between secular and religious forces, and secular and religious modalities of 
critique. The book was read by none other than Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had organized 
a memorial service upon the death of Al-e Ahmad’s father in 1962.64 Just as the term gharbzadegi,  
would gradually find itself seamlessly assimilated into Khomeini’s populist lexicon, it would at 
times, be deployed as a cudgel with which to castigate liberal intellectuals and Marxist-Leninist 
organizations and cast them as beholden to foreign ideologies and agents of cultural imperialism 
and domination.  
 
Following the revolution Shams Al-e Ahmad became a member of the Council for Cultural 
Revolution (Setad-e enqelab-e farhangi) tasked by Khomeini with overhauling Iran’s university 
system and ensuring it conform to the diktats of the newly established Islamic order.65 It was thus 
essential to draw a stark line between Jalal Al-e Ahmad and fellow members of the League of 
Socialists such as Maleki and the latter’s half-brother Hossein Malek, who would go on to become 
a close aide of the Shah’s last Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar. Indeed, Shams Al-e Ahmad felt 
compelled to include an account by Iran’s current Supreme Leader and then president, Hojjat al-
Islam ʿAli Khamenei, who upon reading the first essay Safar beh velayat-e esraʾil as a young and 
                                               
63 Dar khedmat va khiyanat-e rowshanfekran  (Tehran, 1388 [2009]). 
64 Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran  (London, 2014 [1985])., Loc 5201.  
65 Shahrzad Mojab, "The State and University: The "Islamic Cultural Revolution" in the Institutions of Higher 
Education of Iran, 1980-87" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991). 
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politically engaged seminarian felt it necessary to telephone the author of the much admired 
Gharbzadegi and “in the manner of disciple” (moridaneh) voice his protestations.66 That being 
said, while Shams Al-e Ahmad perhaps understated his brother’s genuine curiosity and the way he 
was impressed by aspects of Israeli society, there is little doubt that profound ideological and 
political cleavages divided Al-e Ahmad from his counterparts in the League of Iranian Socialists. 
These cleavages were not only thrown into stark relief with the publication of Gharbzadegi but 
were also irreparably deepened following the brutally repressed uprisings of June 1963, where 
Khomeini entered the national consciousness for the first time.67 
 
The second historiographical appropriation pertains to a not uncommon Israeli view epitomized in 
the work of Eldad Pardo, that saw in Al-e Ahmad’s SVE a “forgotten encounter of mutual 
understanding” in which one of the fathers of so-called Islamic nativism speaks about Israel in 
well-nigh glowing terms. While none of Al-e Ahmad’s works have yet been published in Hebrew 
in full (most non-specialists in Israel have not even heard of him), his visit to Israel and the 
travelogue clearly captured the imagination of some Israeli writers and journalists as reflecting a 
bygone era and the tragic loss of Israel’s “natural” ally in a sea of unmitigated hostility. SVE 
harkens back to a time when the Cold War era periphery doctrine remained a tenable proposition 
and non-Arab states aligned to the United States might unite against the tide of a virulent and ever-
threatening Arab nationalism.68 In this sense, such treatments are commonly shot through with 
nostalgia and longing for a return to a now lost epoch.  
                                               
66 Al-e Ahmad, Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 40.  
67 Negin Nabavi, Intellectuals and the State in Iran: Politics, Discourse and the Dilemma of Authenticity  
(Gainesville; Tallahassee, 2003)., Chapter 3.  
68 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.  (New Haven and London, 
2007)., Chapter 2.  
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This might be seen as a more sophisticated thread of a wider narrative of the good old times, a 
yearning for the “wondrous love affair” between Israel and Pahlavi Iran,69 when Israeli 
businessmen, politicians, military and security advisers and intelligence officers played a not 
insignificant role in Iran, subverting the Arab opposition to Israel and facilitating an elaborate trade 
relationship while enjoying a luxurious lifestyle reserved for the wealthy and jet-set.70 Most 
significantly, this nostalgia had a heavy ideological bent, as it was motivated by a sense of 
vindication of Zionist nationhood. As Haggai Ram convincingly argues, to understand this 
nostalgia “we need to direct our attention to the cultural values at work [here].” Ram adds, 
 
monarchical Iran assumed a special place in Israeli imagination 
because it seemed to vindicate the innermost spatial, temporal, and 
civilizational assumptions of Zionist political theology. As both 
states shared a common space in the “imaginative geography of the 
‘our land–barbarian land’ variety,” Israel drew hope from Iran that 
its fantastic undertaking of constructing a Euro-American enclave 
in the heart of the Orient was a feasible task.71  
 
Read in this context, Al-e Ahmad’s travelogue is seen by some Israeli scholars as manifesting an 
outsider’s appreciation of a miraculous Zionist undertaking. The nostalgia here is dual: it yearns 
both for the return of a positive, advantageous relationship with Iran and for a renewed appreciation 
                                               
69 Haggai Ram, Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession (Stanford, California, 2009)., Loc 750. 
70 This has been captured, for example, in a documentary on the lives of Israelis in pre-revolutionary Iran, Dan 
Shadur and Barak  Heymann, "Before the Revolution " (Israel 2013). 
71 Ram, Iranophobia., Loc 750.  
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of a “pure,” almost naive Zionism. Pardo’s treatment (given as an introduction to the Hebrew 
translation of SVE’s first chapter), for example, reads Al-e Ahmad’s text as vindicating what the 
author calls Ben-Gurion’s “practical utopia” in which the Zionist project redeems not only the 
Jews but also the world at large.72 Published in 2004, in the context of the waning of Zionist 
ideological fervor in Israel itself, this treatment of Al-e Ahmad renders him an authentic proponent 
of Zionism, who may remind his Israeli readers of the ideological commitments they themselves 
have long neglected.  Reading SVE alongside other similar Iranian reports from Israel, the author 
concludes that these texts “teach…what the Iranian visitors have found in Israel was primarily a 
society that is well aware of its path, a practical and moral society, working quietly and securely 
toward the accomplishment of its goals, while happily sharing its achievements with others.”73, 
Reading SVE ultimately leaves its Hebrew translator with a sense of a tragic, unfortunate loss, that 
is both internal and external: a loss of an Israeli, Zionist manifestation of a utopian ideal, in which 
what used to be “a symbol of naivete and solidarity” became simply “normal [...] and the magic 
evaporated.”74  
 
The Guardianship State and Sacred Sovereignty 
 
Al-e Ahmad’s original essay Safar beh velayat-e esraʾil or “Journey to the Land (velayat) of Israel” 
opens with a semantic ambiguity. In his words, “Jewish rule (hokumat-e yahud) in the land of 
Palestine is a kind of ‘guardianship’ (velayat), and not a government (dowlat). It is the rule of the 
new guardians (owliyaʾ) of the Israelites over the promised land, and not a state (hokumat) of the 
                                               
72 Eldad  Pardo, "Yisrael kemofet beʿeini hasmol hairani bishnot hashishim: maamar veteʿuda," ʿIyunim bitqumat 
yisrael 14(2004)., 341. 
73 Ibid., 343. 
74 Ibid., 343.  
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inhabitants of Palestine over Palestine.”75 As noted by Samuel Thrope, Al-e Ahmad is playing on 
the notion of “velayat”,76 which can mean both “province” or the authority in control thereof, as 
well as “guardianship” implying both spiritual and worldly authority. Given Al-e Ahmad’s 
upbringing in a clerical family and his own unrealized attempt to take up the clerical mantle of his 
father in the seminaries of Najaf, Iraq, this is clearly a conscious and provocative choice of 
terminology on his part. It is thus of paramount importance to consider the manifold meanings of 
the term velayat in Shiʿi Islam. The Arabic wilaya from which the Persian velayat derives, 
alongside the notion of walaya, are essential to the Shiʿi faith and the way in which spiritual 
authority is conceived. As Vincent J. Cornell argues wilaya and walaya are “semantic fraternal 
twins that co-exist symbiotically”.77 The two terms are related in meaning, but nevertheless 
different. Wilaya has historically connoted authority, power or the ability to act. While Islamic 
studies scholars have generally translated walaya as “sainthood” because in mystical literature it 
has signified a relationship of friendship, love and intimacy with God.  
 
The doctrine of Imamate in Twelver Shiʿi Islam, contends that there is a designated lineage of 
infallible descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, beginning with his son-in-law ʿAli ibn Abi 
Taleb and the progeny born from his marriage to the Prophet’s daughter, Fatemeh. The Imams are 
not only figured as the temporal and spiritual leaders of the Shiʿites, but belief in their sacred status, 
is itself integral to the believer’s salvation. In the words of Amir-Moezzi and Jambert, “walaya is 
the indispensable complement of prophecy.” The Imam’s walaya relates to his ontological status 
                                               
75 Al-e Ahmad, Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 53.  
76 The Israeli Republic , Loc 37.  
77 Vicent J.  Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism  (Austin, 1998)., Loc 321 
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and reality as a theophany of the revealed God.78 Moreover, walaya had been figured as a dualistic 
concept, insofar as the love for the Imam has come to be seen as inseparable from hatred of his 
enemies: “walaya (sacred love for the Guide of all knowledge) is inseparable from its opposite, 
baraʾa (sacred disassociation from the forces of ignorance).”79 
      
The vali Allah (pl. owliyaʾ), a staple of Sufi literature and later Shiʿi iterations in ʿerfan, as the 
bearer of wilaya or velayat, can be said to derive their authority from their unrivaled piety and 
spiritual devotion and status as one of the “friends of God”.80 Hence, their designation as saints. 
When Al-e Ahmad uses the term owliyaʾ to describe the new rulers of Israel, he is not only drawing 
attention to the Zionist leaders’ claims to constitute a legitimate political authority in their capacity 
as the rightful rulers of the Jewish people, but also speaking to the supposed divine mandate which 
forms the basis of the political order and its sovereign claim.  
 
Al-e Ahmad does, however, simultaneously move to demystify any such politico-theological claim 
and appeal to divine providence by contending that Israel’s establishment “was thanks, in fact, 
either to the force of time, the necessities of politics, the clear vision of their guardians, or the 
dictates of economics and unfettered capitalism”.81 Nevertheless, he continues to irreverently 
interweave what he takes to be the political and religious velayat and guardianship of Israel’s 
founders: “Ben-Gurion is no less than Enoch, and Moshe Dayan no less than Joab: these new 
guardians, each one with his own prophecies or— at least— clear-vision, built a guardianship state 
                                               
78 Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi and Christian Jambet, What is Shiʿi Islam? An Introduction trans. Kenneth Casler 
and Eric  Ormsby (Abingdon, Oxon & New York, 2018)., 72.  
79 Ibid., 73.  
80 See, Ata Anzali, "Mysticism" in Iran: The Safavid Roots of a Modern Concept (Columbia, South Carolina, 2017). 
Alexander Knysh, "Irfan Revisted: Khomeini and the Legacy of Islamic Mystical Philosophy," Middle East Journal 
46, no. 4 (1992). 
81 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 351. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 47. 
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in the land of Palestine and called to it all the Children of Israel...like it or not, now governs and 
acts in the name of all the twelve million Jews scattered around the world.”82 He thus takes the 
Zionist leaders claim to political and theological guardianship over Jews the world over as an 
inescapable conclusion of the guardian state’s constitution in the Holy Land.  
  
Al-e Ahmad exudes palpable admiration for this sense of divine mission, which refuses to be bound 
by norms not of its own making. This mission and sense of purpose casts its guardians as “those 
who march onward in the name of something loftier than human rights declarations.” In this respect 
Al-e Ahmad can be seen to be enunciating a deeper point about the structure of sovereignty and 
its theo-political origins. 83 The owliyaʾ, the saints and guardians of the new sovereign polity, are 
those who are willing to decide on the exception to the norm in the constitution and affirmation of 
sovereignty. “Israel, with all its faults and all the contradictions concealed in it, is a base of power, 
a first step, the herald of a future not too far off.”84 Not unproblematically, he observed the 
potentialities of what Michel Foucault would later name in his reportage on the Iranian Revolution 
a “spiritual politics”, which sought to announce a rupture with the soulless bureaucracy and tedium 
of the administrative state and bring about a transformation of self and society in the process.85 
This logic of sovereign constitution lies at the heart of Al-e Ahmad’s admiration for the Israeli 
state, even while he understands full well the grim exclusions, bloody expulsions and militarism 
                                               
82 The Israeli Republic , Loc 360. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 48. 
83 In light with this idea of theo-sovereignty, Al-e Ahmad mentions the trial of Adolf Eichmann which had been 
convened only a couple of years prior to his visit. In certain respects, he appears to echo the conception of justice 
held by the special tribunal of the Jerusalem District Court famously described by Hannah Arendt, namely that “only 
a Jewish court could render justice to Jews, and that it was the business of Jews to sit in judgment on their enemies.” 
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, 1977)., 7. Al-e Ahmad, Safar 
beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 48. 
84 The Israeli Republic , Loc 382-383. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 50. 
85 See, Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment  
(Minneapolis & London, 2016).  
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upon which it is founded and that arguably perpetuate its existence in its present incarnation: “it is 
a source of power and also— on that very account— a source of danger...in the Jewish spectacle 
of martyrdom, the memorialization of the war’s murdered and gone, I see the other side of the coin 
of Fascism and a dependence on the racism which replaced it.”86 Such ambivalence and double-
sidedness is entirely absent from the effusive accounts of Maleki and Ashuri and their 
wholehearted embrace of socialist Zionism. Where they saw a socialist haven, Al-e Ahmad already 
sensed the prospect by means of which the persecuted becomes the persecutor, and the 
entanglement in coloniality is inexorable.  
 
Al-e Ahmad’s initial essay of 1964 remains laced with admiration, ambiguity and at times caustic 
asides. This ambivalence has been understated by even his more perceptive interpreters who tend 
to almost exclusively focus on the more enthusiastic pronouncements. Al-e Ahmad senses a 
historical and constitutive power in what he refers to as the Israeli guardianship state, and espied 
potentialities much like Foucault would a decade and a half later in Iran. This is while always 
acknowledging what he took to be the Israeli state’s conduciveness to aid the internationalization 
of capital and forms of capitalist exchange and exploitation as well as cooperate with and abet the 
imperial powers’ self-aggrandizement and domination of the non-European world. As he remarks, 
“Israel is the veil (hijab) Christianity drew between itself and the world of Islam in order to prevent 
me from seeing the real danger”.87 Indeed, as is evident from his earlier Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad 
clearly sees the “real danger” to be emanating from Euro-American economic, political and 
cultural imperialism as it hollows out any prospect for Iranians and their counterparts in the 
decolonizing world to reflect and envision themselves beyond the terms and categories set down 
                                               
86 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 377-402-404. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 52. 
87 The Israeli Republic , Loc 394-395 (Translation modified). Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 51. 
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in the epistemologies and political ontologies forged in the West, and the very same imperial 
heartland seeking to dominate them.  
 
The Guardianship of the Jurist and Theo-politics in Contemporary Shiʿi Islam 
 
For the contemporary reader velayat is significant for another reason, since it appears to echo with 
the theological doctrine underpinning the post-revolutionary Iranian state, to wit, the doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih. While the “Guardianship of the Jurist” had a historical precedent in the 19th 
century, it was not until 1970, a year after Al-e Ahmad’s death that Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
conception of hierocratic rule would be delivered in a series of lectures from exile in the hallowed 
shrine city of Najaf. For several reasons, including the latter, it would be mistaken to draw the 
conclusion that Khomeini’s theory directly informed Al-e Ahmad’s travelogue or that he could 
have possibly envisioned the Islamic state and clerically-led constitutional order that would, to 
nearly everyone’s dismay, emerge in 1979. The velayat spoken of by Al-e Ahmad never receives 
a jurisprudential rationale or expression, rather it is a kind of generative power harboring sovereign 
potentialities capable of summoning new modes of life and being-together into existence. It was 
not a precursor to the Islamic Republic in concreto, but rather a call for a new political order 
beyond coloniality.  
 
An argument for direct clerical rule and seizure of the modern state apparatus would have to wait 
until Khomeini’s intervention, and even then, it would take a popular revolution and unforeseeable 
conjunction of events by which it would find itself enshrined as part of the Islamic Republic’s 
constitutional order. The much-bemoaned paucity of literature regarding Shiʿi theories of 
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government was in large part because the idea of an Islamic state had been largely deferred in Shiʿi 
theology and jurisprudence in anticipation of the Imam’s millennial return. But in his essay, Al-e 
Ahmad is expressing his wonderment for what he takes to be a theo-politics which had refused 
forbearance to establish a sovereign power in the present. Al-e Ahmad’s theo-politics of velayat 
was never systematically articulated. Indeed, Al-e Ahmad always abjured any form or inclination 
to system-building or systematic explication, in a fashion that would later find concrete realization 
in the world. While patently not the velayat of the jurist, or the secular nation-state, it stands as a 
horizon and intimation of a politics to-come. 
 
As indicated above, the core difference delineating Al-e Ahmad from his friends in the League of 
Iranian Socialists is his position vis-à-vis the category of coloniality. Unlike Ashuri or Maleki, Al-
e Ahmad never lost sight of the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe),88 “for more than ten years these 
same Palestinian refugees have been paying the penance for someone else’s sin in that hellish 
cauldron.”89 Indeed, he pointedly reminds his interlocutor in the kibbutz he visits, “It is true that 
this is your fabled promised land. But do not forget that you took this territory by force and you 
do not get along with the true owners (saheban-e asli).”90 Thus, even while he could admire Israel’s 
as a “guardianship state”, he still was of the view that Israel’s emergence was conducive to the 
spread of Western capitalism and penance for Europe’s long and gruesome history of anti-
Semitism culminating in the mass extermination of European Jewry. “From my perspective as an 
Easterner,” he wrote:  
 
                                               
88 Masalha, The Palestine Nakba , Chapter 5.  
89 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 397. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 51. 
90 The Israeli Republic , Loc 662-663. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 79. 
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the current government of Israel, on the one hand, is the sure bridgehead of Western 
capitalism, which reappeared in the East in a different form and in other garb 
following the Second World War. I have grounds for debate with this aspect of 
Israel. And, on the other hand, Israel is a coarsely realized indemnity for the 
Fascists’ sins in Dachau, Buchenwald, and the other death camps during the war. 
Pay close attention: that is the West’s sin and I, an Easterner, am paying the price. 
Western man exported the capital for this indemnity, whereas I in the East provided 
the land.91 
 
European anti-Semitism, native expulsion and colonial racism by Al-e Ahmad’s lights are 
profoundly intertwined and ultimately inseparable.92 Despite being practicably and 
phenomenologically distinct, they are driven by comparable ways of envisioning the Other 
with their corresponding logics of degradation, subordination and occlusion.  
 
Othering Arabs, Awakening Islam  
 
     From the above quote, we see Al-e Ahmad clearly identifying himself as an “Easterner” 
alongside Palestinian Arabs. But at other points he appears to reprise anti-Arab prejudices, 
                                               
91 The Israeli Republic , Loc 392-393. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 51. 
92 The influence of Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew (1948), but more likely his famed preface to Frantz’s Fanon’s The 
Wretched of the Earth (1961) as well as the work itself published a couple of years earlier, in addition to Albert 
Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957) are palpable. Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew: An 
Exploration of the Etiology of Hate, trans. George J.  Becker (New York, 1948). Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth (New York, 2004). Albert  Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. Howard Greenfeld (London and 
New York, 2003). 
     According to Ali Rahnema, Al-e Ahmad charged ʿAli Shariʿati with translating Memmi’s classic work, but he 
was unable to finish it “apparently because it was too difficult”. The French-trained leftist historian Homa Nateq 
would eventually translate it. Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariʿati  (London, 
1998)., 190-191.  
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which have been a staple of Iranian nationalism. These prejudices were given new 
prominence in the late Qajar period and amongst modernist intellectuals such as Fath-ʿAli 
Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani,93  also influencing the process of 
authoritarian nation-building undertaken by the Pahlavis between 1925 and 1979.94 In 
actuality, Al-e Ahmad’s position is somewhat more complex and convoluted. He does not 
dismiss Iran’s Arab neighbors as “barbarians” who foisted their religion and alphabet on 
an otherwise pristine Persian ethnos and homeland,95 as Akhundzadeh might have. Rather 
he declares his status as a “non-Arab Easterner”, and his own sense of exclusion and having 
been relegated to the category of the uncivilized by “the Arabs”: “With all that I have borne 
the burden of Islam on my shoulders, and still bear it, they still consider me a ‘barbarian’ 
(ʿajam). They call me a ‘rejectionist’ (rafezi). They do not respect Shiites’ right to exist.” 
He appears to place blame at the door of an enveloping abstraction and blame all Arabs in 
his indignation at sectarian discrimination. The term “rafezi”, however, is a well-
established sectarian denigration of Shiʿi Muslims, which would also extend to Arabs of 
the Shiʿi faith.96 Al-e Ahmad identifies as a non-Arab Easterner, while as a sayyid, his 
father and ancestral forebears would have traced their genealogy all the way back to the 
Prophet Mohammad and his family, the ahl al-bayt; a great source of pride and reverence 
in Shiʿi culture.  
                                               
93 Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation (New York, 
2016)., 60. Al-e Ahmad was familiar with the writings of Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani and alludes to his Three Letters 
to Jalal al-Dowleh in Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West, trans. R. Campbell, Introduction by 
Hamid Algar ed. (Berkeley, 1984)., Loc 933.  
94 See, Afshin  Marashi, Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940  (Seattle, WA, 2008). 
95 One only has to look at his comments vis-à-vis Kasravi and the question of “language purification” to see his 
rejection of such ethno-nationalist chauvinism or secularizing zeal. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Mokalemat: Gofteh-ha va 
shenideh-ha (Tehran, 1374 [1995])., 82.  
96 Thrope translates ʿajam as “barbarian” and rafezi as “sectarian”. The former is generally understood as a racial 
pejorative, meaning those whose mother tongue is not Arabic. We have amended the translation in the case of rafezi, 
a well-known sectarian denigration used in reference to Shiʿi Muslims and their rejection of the leadership of the 
first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman.  The Israeli Republic , 461-462. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 59. 
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What the reader soon realizes though is that much of this digression is symptomatic of, 
even if by no means reducible to, resentment of those Arabs, fellow Easterners, he takes to 
be enthralled to the United States, its commodity fetishism and consumerism. It thus can 
be said to amount to a rather easy swipe at Arab rulers and those who directly benefited 
from this clientelist relationship in the Persian Gulf: “I am the only ‘barbarian’ (ʿajam) in 
the world to these Arabs driving Cadillacs by the shores of the Gulf! All the other 
‘barbarians’ have turned into princes and oil magnates.”97 This contempt for the Arab states 
of the Persian Gulf and their newfound oil wealth as well as of their absolutist monarchies’ 
close association with the United States and their obeisance to the hegemony of the dollar 
is overlain with a thinly veiled Persian chauvinism, which saw its neighbors as lesser and 
inferior on an imagined civilizational hierarchy: “If there was a day when my pilgrimage 
and the pilgrimages of Easterners like me provided the cost of living for a year for all the 
Bedouin of the Hejaz, now it is from the crumbs of the feast of oil that the Saudi progeny 
fulfill their every desire, and the camels lack nothing either.”98 Though tinged with irony, 
for all its crudity and racialized stereotypes (many of which Iranians have also found 
themselves subject to), Al-e Ahmad is trying to interpret sectarianism and anti-Shiʿi bigotry 
as part of a neo-colonial predicament of “divide and rule”, fragmenting and dividing the 
Islamic world. When Al-e Ahmad speaks of “ignoble and rootless Arabs” (aʿrab-e bi-
esalat) he is speaking of those elites who are buoyed, even pleased by Israel’s presence in 
the region.99 This is why at the same time he argues that perhaps only the presence of Israel, 
                                               
97 The Israeli Republic , 471-472. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 60. 
98 The Israeli Republic , Loc 498-500. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 62 
99 Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 62. 
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almost in terms reminiscent of an existential enemy, in the East, might engender the 
circumstances whereby the Islamic world might re-awaken and refashion itself anew. He 
observes:   
 
The skin that has remained at the foot of the old but robust tree of 
Islam in this arid desert— as the remnant of a lizard who lived once 
upon a time— must be uprooted by the hurricane of the fear of the 
existence of Israel in order for me, the Easterner, to be able to be 
freed from the tyranny of the puppet petro-regimes and feel the 
presence of Islam now crushed under the tracks of American tanks 
throughout the East.100 
 
In his own visit to the kibbutz upon observing a parade of arms and weapons, and quite unlike 
Ashuri, who appears to have hardly questioned his Israeli interlocutors, Al-e Ahmad poignantly 
asks, “How long will it be necessary to motivate people with fear?” In a most prescient remark, he 
elaborates upon how the cycle of threats and militarism is likely to become never-ending and 
ultimately distracts from more emancipatory political projects that have the potential to unite 
Israeli Jews and their adversaries, “You yourselves are constantly playing with fire. When you 
frighten their side [i.e. the Arabs] you yourselves have to become frightened as well. And in place 
of eliminating your class differences, you spend your resources building shelters.”101 He even 
mentions the Austrian-born philosopher Martin Buber and his well-established support for a 
                                               
100 The Israeli Republic , Loc 508-510. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 63. 
101 The Israeli Republic , Loc 659. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 79. 
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binational state.102 Moreover, unlike Ashuri and Maleki who revel in what they see as a socialist 
utopia, Al-e Ahmad is far more skeptical regarding the longevity of the kibbutz, as he declares, 
“In the days when kibbutzes were first founded— and we mentioned Koestler’s Thieves in the 
Night— the residents had a sort of military lifestyle and worked in a barracks environment. But 
now those days are gone and I am certain that when the Arab threat has passed, the kibbutz will 
be abolished.”103 He sees the connections between socialist Zionism, militarism and colonialism 
in a way Maleki never could and convincingly foresees how a society consumed by fear will 
steadily unravel from within.104 
 
The Anti-Colonial Cognoscenti and the Politics of Recognition After 1967 
 
Al-e Ahmad’s understanding of the figure of “the West” and colonial modernity, in comparison to 
leading intellectuals of the League of Iranian Socialists examined above, clearly sets him apart.105 
He was attuned and able to recognize manifold occlusions and oppressions in ways which Maleki 
and Ashuri simply could not, and this led him to have a far more complicated and nuanced view 
of the Israeli state.  
 
While undoubtedly influenced by Maleki, both politically and intellectually, Al-e Ahmad was by 
no means constrained by him, and articulated positions which often little resembled those of his 
erstwhile mentor. Unlike Maleki, Al-e Ahmad was comfortable and at ease moving between the 
                                               
102 The Israeli Republic , Loc 714. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 84. 
103 The Israeli Republic , Loc 676-678. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 79-80. 
104 Afshin Matin-Asgari rightly argues that despite his lifelong respect and admiration for Maleki, Al-e Ahmad 
rejected his “total identification with European cultural models”. Afshin Matin-asgari, Both Eastern and Western: 
An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity  (Cambridge and New York, 2018)., 187. 
105 Hamid Dabashi, Iran Without Borders: Towards a Critique of the Postcolonial Nation (London and New York, 
2016)., Loc 1451. 
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ostensibly religious and secular, and this comfort surely fostered a proclivity to see profound 
energy, verve and power within Iran’s Shiʿi Islamic heritage, cultural practices and institutions. 
Indeed, the differences separating them on this issue were thrown into stark relief in their 
respective reactions of the 15 Khordad (June 1963) uprisings in Qom and several other Iranian 
cities, where Al-e Ahmad came to see in the political clergy a bulwark against imperial 
encroachment.106 Just as he saw certain political theological potentialities and dangers in the 
establishment of Israel, he came to appreciate the sovereign resources of Iran’s own Shiʿi Islamic 
tradition.  
 
Al-e Ahmad’s views on Israel have often been split into a crude pre- and post-1967 binary: awe 
and deep affection for Israel prior to the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, and disgust in its aftermath. 
From the exposition above, it should be apparent that his views were in fact far more complicated. 
Moreover, unlike much of the secondary literature which is inclined to reductively psychologize 
Al-e Ahmad’s evolving views on Israel in terms of a personal “search for authenticity” or “return 
to Islam”,107 it is instead crucial to appreciate his longstanding rejection of the colonial domination 
of the non-European world. Likewise, it is important to appreciate the influence of Maleki’s 
theorization of non-alignment, despite the latter’s infatuation with socialist Zionism and complete 
blindness to the settler-colonial matrix, of which the Zionist movement was indubitably a part. The 
article Al-e Ahmad published two weeks after June 1967, however, which ultimately came to 
constitute SVE’s final chapter, appeared on Iran’s literary scene as the conflict’s transformative 
impact on the Middle East was still barely understood. Al-e Ahmad achieves some distance by 
                                               
106 Al-e Ahmad, Dar khedmat va khiyanat-e rowshanfekran., 225. 
107 Though biographical information of this sort can hardly be said to be irrelevant, it would be a mistake to reduce 
the political dimension of Al-e Ahmad’s positions to such. Even Simin Daneshvar does this on occasion in her 
writings about him. Simin Daneshvar, Ghorub-e Jalal  (Tehran, 1360 [1982])., 6.  
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attributing the “nonsense and beard-pulling” to himself and the “reasonable speech” to a “friend” 
living in Paris. Whether it was based on his conversations with real-life colleagues in Paris is 
unclear. The book’s editor Shams Al-e Ahmad was clearly incentivized to attribute it exclusively 
to his brother, given the uncompromising nature of the criticisms contained therein, while Jalal Al-
e Ahmad himself was probably concerned about retaliation by SAVAK given how it reflected on 
the Shah’s regime and its foreign policy. 
 
What is most striking in this final chapter is the linkages it makes between deep-seated racism in 
the metropole, specifically France, and imperialism abroad, and the immense failure of the left-
wing French intelligentsia to understand the colonial dimension of the Israeli state vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians and the broader Middle East. He unambiguously links the violent anti-Arab racism 
heard on the streets of Paris following the war,108 to the French, British and Israeli bid to invade 
and occupy the Suez Canal in 1956, and to the brutal colonial war fought by France in its own 
settler-colonial enterprise in Algeria between 1954-1962.109 Contemporary racism in France is 
depicted as the outgrowth of colonial racism abroad, and the defense of Israel’s coloniality is 
framed as the circuitous result of the French intelligentsia’s failure to come to grips with its 
country’s own ignoble history of imperialism in the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally, he 
connects Israel’s role in a global and vast counter-revolutionary rearguard, mentioning General 
Moshe Dayan’s “internship” in Vietnam,110 and alleges he had gone “to observe how the so-called 
civilized Americans are massacring the hungry, savage people of Vietnam with napalm, fire bombs 
                                               
108 Yoav Di-Capua, No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization  (Chicago and London, 
2018)., 243.  
109 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 733. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 87. 
110 Dayan visited the American forces in Vietnam in 1966, just before he assumed the role of Minister of Defense 
prior to the June 1967 war. Moshe Dayan, Yoman Vietnam (Tel Aviv, 1977). 
 Accepted Pre-Publication, Pre-Edited Version 
37 
 
and flamethrowers!” Al-e Ahmad quotes none other than the Martiniquais poet and intellectual, 
Aimé Césaire in a searing denunciation of those writers he had once revered and partially 
translated, namely, Sartre, Ionesco and Claude Lanzmann, whose vehement pro-Israeli sympathies 
were hardly a secret:111 ‘All these animals of various colors are belligerent troops of colonialism. 
They are all slave traders and they are all debtors to the revolution.’112 “All rushed together to the 
aid of civilized Israel in its war against the backward and savage Arabs”, Al-e Ahmad adds.113  
 
Israel’s recent incorporation into the relatively novel confection of “Judeo-Christian 
civilization”114 represents the latest attempt of colonialism and its intellectual defenders’ struggle 
to efface the “color line” and racialized hierarchy dominating and defining the international 
system. In the earlier essay, Al-e Ahmad juxtaposes two watershed moments in the ontology of 
coloniality subsequently theorized at length in the work of Sylvia Wynter, amongst others – 
namely, the expulsion of the Jewish community from Spain after the defeat of the last Arab emirate 
at Granada and Christopher Columbus’s landing in the Americas in 1492 and the violent 
depredations and genocide of indigenous peoples which followed.115 And in doing so, he forcefully 
throws into question European statesmen and intellectuals’ pretense to solidarity with the Jewish 
victims of Fascism and the recent vintage and ultimate hollowness of their public pronouncements 
on the virtues of the “Judeo-Christian West”. 
                                               
111 Claude Lanzmann, The Patagonian Hare: A Memoir trans. Frank  Wynne (London, 2012)., 225. Di-Capua 
documents in meticulous detail Lanzmann’s many efforts to influence the older Sartre’s views on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict during their trip alongside Simone de Beauvoir, to Israel in 1965. Di-Capua, No Exit., Chapters 1, 9. 
112 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 736. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 87. 
113 The Israeli Republic , Loc 755. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 88-89. 
114 Richard W.  Bulliet, The Case For Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York Columbia University Press, 2004)., 
p. 10-14.  
115 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 593. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , p. 72. Sylvia  Wynter, "1492: A New 
World View " in Race, Discourse, and the Origin of the Americas: A New World View ed. Vera L.  Hyatt and Rex  
Nettleford (Washington and London, 1994)., 13. Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation - An Argument " The New 
Centennial Review 3(2003)., 307-308.  
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     In another reprise of Césaire, Al-e Ahmad argues that Hitlerian fascism was merely an instance 
of what “Christian bourgeois” civilization had long wreaked across the non-European world.116 
He acidly declaims,  
 
While the illustrious European intellectuals were accomplices in 
Hitler’s crimes, and at that hour did not say a word in protest, now 
they have given those same Jews a bridgehead in the Middle East so 
that the nations of Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq can be scourged, 
and so that they will not nurture a thought of struggling against 
Western colonialism in their heads, and they can never again close 
the Suez Canal to the civilized nations!117 
 
Al-e Ahmad vitriolically rails against the abject hypocrisy of the European intelligentsia and 
condemns their silence during the Judeocide, just as today they support what he plainly regards as 
the Israeli colonial beachhead in the Middle East to advance Western imperial interests. Whereas 
in the earlier essay of 1964, he posited that support for Israel had been in part a quid pro quo for 
Europe’s shameful role and complicity in the mass extermination of European Jewry, he now, in 
line with much radical Arab writing at the time, denounces Europe’s support for a colonial 
endeavor of different kind, even as he at times brazenly regurgitates a number of well-worn anti-
Semitic tropes.118 His main focus however is how Israel, the Pahlavi state, and the U.S.’s Arab 
allies perpetuate and metastasize a global imperial system, “the Americans who without Iranian 
                                               
116 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham, Kindle ed. (New York, 1972, 2000)., 36.  
117 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 770. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 90. 
118 The Israeli Republic , Loc 892. 
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and Persian Gulf oil would not be able to endure one moment in Vietnam”,119 and thereby further 
entrench the “world color line”.120 The vestiges of anti-Arab prejudice, which colored the earlier 
essay had dissipated and were supplanted by a new binary, the forces of radical anti-colonialism 
standing off against those of the global counter-revolution. 
 
Despite the overflowing rage and venom characterizing this chapter, Al-e Ahmad ends his diatribe 
by calling on Israel to separate its fate from that of Zionism, which he now regards as irremediably 
racist and wedded to Western imperial machinations in the Middle East. He mocks and forcefully 
rejects demagogic threats by Arab leaders pledging to throw Israeli Jews into the sea and instead, 
once again, cites the example of Martin Buber,121 and the ideal of a bi-national state of Arabs and 
Jews living alongside one another: “The only solution to the problem is forming a federal 
government of Arabs and Jews called Palestine”, he intones.122  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
This article has sought to investigate Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s shifting views of Israel and the Zionist 
movement and the intimations of a new kind of generative theo-politics unconstrained by norms 
or the international legal order. As we have shown, his politico-theological account of Israel as a 
“guardianship state” evinces hopefulness, as well as ambivalence, as he thought it harbored 
immense potentialities and generative effects to summon into being a new kind of politics as well 
                                               
119 Ibid., Loc 844. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 95. 
120 Bill V.  Mullen, W.E.B. Du Bois: Revolutionary Across the Color Line (London, 2016)., Loc 563,  
121 For more on Buber’s cultural Zionism and political advocacy of a bi-national state in Palestine see, Samuel 
Hayim Brody, Martin Buber's Theopolitics (Bloomington, Indiana, 2018)., Chapter 7.  
122 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic , Loc 919. Safar beh velayat-e ʿezraʾil , 101. 
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as forms of sociality, which ultimately elude the colonial form of the nation-state. What 
distinguished Al-e Ahmad’s encounter with Israel from his counterparts in the League of Iranian 
Socialists was his uneasy relationship to the stadial and Eurocentric conceptions of modernization 
and progress. The assumptions that still animated Al-e Ahmad’s one-time mentor Maleki, stood in 
stark contrast to his own cognitive integration of coloniality, predicated on a prior recognition of 
the logics of subjugation and expropriation; logics which he perceived to lie at the very foundations 
of the Zionist enterprise.123 These critical tendencies which run through his best known work, 
Gharbzadegi, as well as his 1964 essay, come to a head in his caustic intervention of 1967 where 
he denounces, in line with the cresting wave of anti-colonial movements of the late sixties, the 
unholy alliance of counter-revolutionary regimes, including the Pahlavi state itself, Israel and the 
United States. But rather than call for Israel’s abolition he calls for a bi-national state in Palestine, 
thereby repudiating ethnocracy and the colonial form of the nation-state, a fate he would also 
firmly reject for Iran,124 and the templates first set down by Europe, which in his mind only 
entrenched imperial domination of the Middle East, while precluding a priori any possibility of 
meaningful co-existence. Through Al-e Ahmad’s writings on Israel, one can espy glimpses of a 
subversive challenge to the way in which sovereignty and the political have been articulated, 
structured and enforced in the modern West and colonial world. We contend that a more nuanced 
view emerges through our contextualization of Al-e Ahmad’s visit alongside similar visits by 
fellow Iranian socialists, bringing to the surface, not only his coming to terms with the myriad 
entanglements of colonial modernity entirely missed by his comrades, but also the lineaments of a 
possible exit.  
                                               
123 Amy Allen has recently sought to critique how these kinds of teleological cum normative commitments continue 
to shape and inform European critical theory. Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative 
Foundations of Critical Theory  (New York, 2016)., 3.  
124 Al-e Ahmad, Dar khedmat va khiyanat-e rowshanfekran., 291.  
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